PROMOTE BREXIT.We need parliament to debate Heath's and others treachery

  • 0 Replies
  • 1553 Views

0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.

*

Offline the leveller

  • Global Moderator
  • *****
  • 4111
  • +75/-0


PROMOTE BREXIT.

 

Please sign this petition right away: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/122770

 

And please ask others to forward this e-mail.

We need parliament to debate Heath's and others' treachery.

 

Magna Carta 1215 remains relevant because it prescribes and defines The Articles of Common Law, the timeless supreme secular law for governing and judging all the acts and motives of men and women in all times and places.

 

N.B. Articles 24, 39, 40, 61: no immunity for government functionaries and employees from cost-free, private citizens' prosecutions (single or multiple plaintiffs) for passing repugnant legislation embodying acts of injustice with malice aforethought.

 


(V) Sovereignty

Distinction must be drawn between the words sovereign and sovereignty. A monarch may be denoted ‘sovereign’ but the constitutionally-bound (or symbolic) monarch explicitly cedes sovereignty, id est, the making and enforcing of the laws, to others, specifically through the Common Law Trial by Jury; viz. Articles 24, 39, 40 and 61, etc.


Definition. Sovereignty, pre-eminence; the supreme and independent power expressed through the making and enforcing of the laws.

 

THE FOLLOWING FIVE FACETS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW TRIAL BY JURY

BESTOW SOVEREIGNTY ON THE CITIZENS IN THE JURY.

Firstly, the Common Law Trial by Jury is prescribed by the 1215 Great Charter Constitution as the one and only legitimate justice system for all causes, civil, criminal and fiscal.

See There Is No ‘get-out clause’ in Magna Carta, Chapter Five.

 

Secondly, Unanimity is requisite to find a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt to protect innocent individuals and minorities. (There is neither moral justice nor political necessity, i.e., deterrent value, for punishing where there was no malice aforethought, no mens rea. In the case of one person injuring another innocently or accidentally, the civil law suit and the Trial by Jury award appropriate compensation for damages.)

See sections on ‘Annulment by Jury,’ ‘Annulment by Jury as Crime Prevention,’ ‘The Illegal Majority ‘Verdict’ and ‘Hung Jury,’ ‘The Meaning behind the Dysphemism ‘Rogue Juror,’ and the following, ‘The Divisibility of Sovereignty.’
Also see section on King Alfred the Great regarding condemnation of judges who interfere, tamper, in the Trial by Jury; Chapter Two.

 

Thirdly, each individual Juror has power to annul the prosecution by finding the accused Not Guilty without obligation to disclose any reason for doing so.

See exemplification of this given by the Old Bailey Commemorative Plaque re the Penn and Mead Trial by Jury and, in finding the Verdict, the Chief Justice’s Ruling on the Jury’s independent power over the law and the directions of the judge; Chapter Two.

Also see the statement of President John Adams, lawyer, in Chapter One.

Also see US v Moylan; and ref. the DC Court of Appeals Ruling; Chapters Two & Four.

 

Fourthly, having sworn to “do justice” (see Common Law Juror’s Oath; VIII; The Justice System), it is axiomatic* that authoritative judgement on the justice and legitimacy of the law which is being processed for enforcement at Trial by Jury is a specific Constitutional Duty binding on the Jurors.

See following section on ‘The Justice System.’ The modern government-altered jurors’ ‘oaths’ are illegitimate on numerous grounds, and inequitably ex parte [one-sided, prejudiced; with a bias]. Also see section on Juror’s Duties re judging on the admissibility of evidence.

*Definition. axiomatic, adjective, self-evident; accepted fact (law); unquestionable.

 

Fifthly, whenever the law itself is unjust the act of its enforcement is crime per se. For a juror not to annul in those circumstances is the criminal act of abetment of the crime of Malicious Prosecution. Jurors absolutely must judge the law. It is the duty of the jurors to ensure that unjust ‘law’ is struck down and the accused tried thereunder is pronounced Not Guilty. This is the dutiful act of Annulment by Jury; a principal duty of the jurors necessitated in the preclusion of the crime of tyranny. The annulment function is intrinsic to and definitive of Trial by Jury. Jurors are there to stop crime in all its manifestations.

 

This fifth point serves to explain firstly, why Common Law and Constitution assign the crime of High Treason to all acts which attenuate the sovereign authority of the juror; secondly, why King Alfred the Great hanged judges who interfered, tampered, in the due process of Common Law Trial by Jury (see as follows in this Chapter); and thirdly, why, for the slightest infringement of Magna Carta, the perpetual Sentence of Curse and Excommunication was prescribed by the lords spiritual, assisted by monarch and lords temporal 1.

1 See Magna Carta, Chapter Five.

REGARDING THE DIVISIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY:

If the elected body imposes any law or regulation which is inconsistent with the People’s sense of justice and fairness, it requires annulment by jurors in Trial by Jury, even by a single juror (unanimity required), who may be part of a minority race or group unfairly discriminated against by the law. In this manner, through the Trial by Jury, sovereignty not only resides with the people as a collective whole, but importantly, it is also embodied ‘divisibly’ with every adult citizen. Trial by Jury is thereby the active principle of democracy: the people rule.

(See Chapter One regarding perjury, kitman, taqiyya; sharia.)

Whether a society is a monarchy, a theocracy or a republic, what converts it from a despotism (a dictatorial, uncivilised state) to a democracy (the civilised state with Trial by Jury operating) is the instalment and implementation of the Trial by Jury through which the people rule. (The word democracy does not replace the word republic. Of course, the republic remains a republic; but it is both definitively and constitutionally a democratic republic.)

Where the society implements Trial by Jury with all its common law stipulations and criteria which exact conformity to the principles of equal justice, then the society is a democracy. This is as opposed to a totalitarian monarchy, republic or theocracy wherein the dominant government personnel iniquitously suppress the people’s right to the definitive Legem Terræ Common Law Trial by Jury Justice System.

Learn the unassailable legal powers given you by your Constitution. See DEMOCRACY DEFINED: The Manifesto ISBN 978-1-902848-24-2, Kindle and book for free from your local library.

Democracy Defined

 

Thanks to Rex Poulton, who writes:

 

In 1960, the Lord Chancellor Lord Kilmuir wrote to Edward Heath advising him that if Britain joined the European Economic Community, it would be contrary to English Constitutional Law. Heath went ahead anyway and in 1972 signed the European Communities Act (ECA) in full knowledge that he was treasonably committing Britain to foreign rule over the heads of the people whom he had deceived with lies that no sovereignty would be lost.

 

His signing the ECA was the most grievous act of high treason in British history. But it also rendered his government an unlawful assembly with no effect in law (as treason can have no effect in law) and as all subsequent parliaments have failed to reverse his treachery, they too have been unlawful assemblies having no legislative power, incapable of any lawful act of government. Successive EU Treaties are therefore of no effect and Britain’s “membership” of the EU has been null and void from the outset.

 

The petition https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/122770 seeks to bring Lord Kilmuir’s letter out into the open so that its content would be debated in Parliament and be discussed openly in public as it has considerable bearing on Britain’s relationship with the EU, the billions of pounds we waste daily on the EU and the many thousands of illegal foreign “laws” with which we are unlawfully burdened every day.

Lord Kilmuir’s letter to Heath appears below. In answer to a letter from Edward Heath written on the 30 November 1960 Lord Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, makes it plain that there are constitutional limitations imposed on Government that prevent our joining the EEC.

 

My Dear Ted,

You wrote to me on the 30th November about the constitutional implications of our becoming a party to the Treaty of Rome. I have now had an opportunity of considering what you say in your letter and have studied the memoranda you sent me. I agree with you that there are important constitutional issues involved.

 

I have no doubt that if we do sign the Treaty, we shall suffer some loss of sovereignty, but before attempting to define or evaluate the loss I wish to make one general observation. At the end of the day, the issue whether or not to join the European Economic Community must be decided on broad political grounds and if it appears from what follows in this letter that I find the constitutional objections serious, that does not mean that I consider them conclusive. I do, however, think it important that we should appreciate clearly from the outset exactly what, from the constitutional point of view, is involved if we sign the treaty, and it is with that consideration in mind that I have addressed myself to the questions you have raised.

 

Adherence to the Treaty of Rome would, in my opinion, affect our sovereignty in three ways:-

a) Parliament would be required to surrender some of its functions to the organs of the community;

b) The Crown would be called upon to transfer part of its treaty-making power to those organs of the Community;

c) Our courts of law would sacrifice some degree of independence by becoming subordinate in certain respects to the European Court of Justice.

 

It is clear that the memorandum prepared by your Legal Advisers that the Council could eventually (after the system of qualified majority voting had come into force) make regulations which would be binding on us even against our wishes, and which would in fact become for us part of the law of the land.

 

There are two ways in which this requirement of the Treaty could in practice be implemented:-

 

Parliament could legislate ad hoc on each occasion that the Council made regulations requiring action by us. The difficulty would be that, since Parliament can bind neither itself nor its successors, we could only comply with our obligations under the Treaty if parliament abandoned its right of passing independent judgement on the legislative proposals put before it.

 

A parallel [to the position of Britain and the EU] would be, for instance, the constitutional convention whereby Parliament passed British North American Bills without question at the request of the Parliament of Canada. In this respect Parliament here would have in substance, if not in form, abdicated its sovereign position and it would have pro tanto, to do the same for the Community.

 

It would in theory, be possible for Parliament to enact at the outset legislation which would give automatic force of law to any existing or future regulations made by the appropriate organs of the Community. For Parliament to do this would go far beyond the most extensive delegation of powers even in wartime that we have ever experienced and I do not think there is any likelihood of this being acceptable to the House of Commons. Whichever course were adopted, Parliament would retain in theory the liberty to repeal the relevant Act or Acts, but I would agree with you that we must act on the assumption that entry into the Community would be irrevocable. We should therefore have to accept a position where Parliament had no more power to repeal its own enactments than it has in practice to abrogate the statute of Westminster. In short, Parliament would have to transfer to the Council, or other appropriate organ of the Community, its substantive powers of legislating over the whole of a very important field.

 

The proposition that every treaty entered into by the United Kingdom does to some extent fetter our freedom of action is plainly true. Some treaties such as GATT and OEEC restrict severely our liberty to make agreements with third parties and I should not regard it as detrimental to our sovereignty that, by signing the Treaty of Rome, we undertook not to make tariff or trade agreements without the Council’s approval. But to transfer to the Council or the Commission the power to make such treaties on our behalf and even against our will, is an entirely different proposition.

 

There seems to me to be a clear distinction between the exercise of the sovereignty involved in the conscious acceptance by us of obligations under treaty-making powers and the total or partial surrender of sovereignty involved in our cession of these powers to some other body. To confer a sovereign state’s treaty-making powers on an international organisation is the first step on the road which leads by way of confederation to the fully federal state. I do not suggest that what is involved would necessarily carry us very far in this direction, but it would be a most significant step and one for which there is no precedent in our case. Moreover, a further surrender of sovereignty of parliamentary supremacy would necessarily be involved: as you know, treaty-making power is vested in the Crown.

 

Parliamentary sanction is required for any treaty which involves a change in the law or the imposition of taxation, to take two examples, and we cannot ratify such a treaty unless Parliament consents. But if binding treaties are to be entered into on our behalf, Parliament must surrender this function and either resign itself to becoming a rubber stamp or give the Community, in effect, the power to amend our domestic laws.

 

There is no precedent for our final appellate tribunal being required to refer questions of law (even in a limited field) to another court and as I assume to be the implication of ‘refer’ -- to accept that court’s decision. You will remember that when a similar proposal was considered in connection with the Council of Europe we felt strong objection to it. I have no doubt that the whole of the legal profession in this country would share my dislike for such a proposal which must inevitably detract from the independence and authority of our courts.

 

Of those three objections, the first two are by far the more important. I must emphasise that in my view the surrenders of sovereignty involved are serious ones and I think that as a matter of practical politics, it will not be easy to persuade Parliament or the public to accept them. I am sure that it would be a great mistake to under-estimate the force of objections to them. But these objections ought to be brought out into the open now because, if we attempt to gloss over them at this state, those who are opposed to the whole idea of our joining the Community will certainly seize on them with more damaging effect later on.

 

Having said this, I would emphasise once again that, although those constitutional considerations must be given their full weight when we come to balance the arguments on either side, I do not for one moment wish to convey the impression that they must necessarily tip the scale. In the long run we shall have to decide whether economic factors require us to make some sacrifices of sovereignty: my concern is to ensure that we should see exactly what it is that we are being called on to sacrifice, and how serious our loss would be.
 

 

Please sign this petition right away:
 https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/122770
               
 



 
Share this topic...
In a forum
(BBCode)
In a site/blog
(HTML)


SMF spam blocked by CleanTalk